PUBLIC CONSEQUENCE INDEX SHOWS CONTINUING DRAMATIC ESCALATION IN TSF FAILURE SEVERITY

indextable1

Although still not final, I wanted to share this very compelling table restating all TSF failures since 1958  by decade ending in 12/31/2017 and introducing the “Public Consequence Index” Bowker Associates has developed to more precisely  describe the dimension of public consequence within our 4 severity categories established as part of the failures database in 2015.  This table and associated graphs, charts, analysis will be part of the soon to be released updated failures data base and the index will be separately documented and presented in a formal paper.

It is important to note that the Bowker Chambers failures database , is “all minerals”: metals, hydrocrabons, other industrial minerals and fertilizers following  form with the original failures database established by  international expert panel convened by ICOLD and UNEP in 2000.

The severity classifications Dr. Chambers & I developed for the TSF failures database were based on the three consequence parameters developed by ICOLD( International Committee on Large Dams) & UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme) in 2000 and first presented in Bulletin 121: release, runout, deaths. The first 4 columns of the above table are counts by decade of those four severity ratings.

The public consequence index, the last column in the above table, is indexed with reference to the decade 1990-​1999 which prompted the UNEP/ICOLD “red alert” leading to the joint evaluation of causes and scale of consequence by the 2000 expert panel which notably included Steven Vick.   This  index  makes it possible to combine the three consequence measures into a single meaningful aggregate score.  By inspection it is clear that government and industry did not heed  the call  Bulletin 121 called for in 2000.  The “public consequnce index” has steadily and dramatically increased  in each of  the  two decades since the global expert panel issued Bulletin 121.

This table is full of revelations and stunning stats and facts.

 

(1) a given count of “very serious” failures for a time period includes a wide variation in degree of consequence within the Bowker-Chambers established for a “very serious”: release >1M cubic meters;  or runout>20km; or multiple deaths.  The present decade 2008-2017 has only more  “very serious failure” relative to the last two decades, but it has a dramatically higher public consequence score.  As compared with the main part of the supercycle decade (here ​ approximated as ​1998-2007) the index increased  by 23%, from 99k to 122k

 

(2) the a​verage storage capacity of all dams in the database increased more than 3 fold to 52 M cubic meters 2008-2017 from 16M cubic meters in the approximate supercycle decade (1998-2007) .  We can’t say that this is an accurate representation of average facility size for all existing facilities globally but it is the best estimate available at the moment.

 

(3) The average release overall increased by almost 5 fold from 21M in 1998-2007 to 93M  2008-2017.  The average release for “very serious” failures increased  more than 6 fold from 3M to 19M ( the attached table does not show the severity indicators by overall severity code.  we will be presenting that in our overall documentation on the index​)

 

(4) The average height for all TSF’s in the data base as compared with the most recent decade is notable as well; 15m overall as compared with 33m 2008-2017. Again impossible to say whether 33 m is an accurate reflection of the entire population of TSF’s globally but it is the best available estimate of global average. The approximate to the reference decade in this table ( 1988-1997) had an average height only 4 m less, at 29 even though 1988-1997 had a much much smaller average release (7.5M cu meters).

 

(5) The combination of storage capacity and height suggests that the dramatically higher Public Consequence Index of the most recent decade and its escalation since the ICOLD/UNEP reference decade is more closely linked to dramatically increased facility capacity which in turn is attributable to the greater demand for waste capacity necessitated by lower grades across all minerals sectors.  It is popularly assumed, though until now never actually measured, that an expected increase in severity of failures would be more driven by greater heights.  As all three of our Bowker-Chambers partnered research projects on causes of failure have suggested pushing capacity and rate of capacity expansion at existing TSF without adequate study is a more central problem

 

 

The three international metals study groups have commissioned a global survey of wastes for the zinc/lead, copper and nickel sectors of metal.  Bowker Associates was invited to ​submit a proposal for this study but suggested Gavin Mudd whose already compiled data bases in these three metals sectors gave him immediate capacity we did not have and could not build.  Gavins study will be presented at the October meeting of national members of the study groups in Lisbon. ( Bowker Associates has also been invited to address national members at this meeting on major risks confronting metals mining governance).  ICMM has also acknowledged the global escalation of waste volume to finished production tonne as a major issue.  John Atherton, Director of ICMM presented at the Study Group meeting in the Spring of 2017.

 

Bowker Associates major  concern for the coming decade is adequate TSF capacity to meet expected production needs across all mineral sectors even with no further across sector declines in available grades.  If the minerals extraction sectors  at the national governance level each choose to proceed at even lower grades, instead of re evaluating viable economic  “hurdle grades”  the public consequence index for the next decade, 2018-2027, will be astronomically higher .

 

By trend line the projected “public consequence index” 2018-2025 will escalate from 122k to 160k, a 31% increase, if national and provincial/local governance does not shift its attention to escalation of mine waste  volumes per unit of mineral produced and introduce supply side reforms which pay realistic attention  to global economic feasibilty hurdles.

 

What we measure is a failure of resource governance.

 

The industry often says that its practices exceed what is required by law and policy, a highly debatable contention, but  public consequence is a government responsibility.   Affected communities must pay closer attention to what the law actually requires and what mechanisms and competence are available for supervision, life of mine, life of facility. 

 

Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager

Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest

15 Cove Meadow Rd.

Stonington, Maine 04681

 

207 367 5145

 

LNBowker@BowkerAssociates.org

 

lindsaynewlandbowker.wordpress.com

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Posted in Catastrophic Tailings Failures, Causes Of Catastrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Center For Science In Public Participation, David M. Chambers, Environmental Risk Management, Frequency of TSF Failures BY Decade, Fundao Talings Dam, ICOLD BULLETIN 121, Lindsay Newland Bowker, massive sulfide risk management, Measuring Magnitude of Consequence TSF Failures, Metallic Mining Risk Management, Mine Risk Management, mining environmental risk management, mining post-supercycle, mining public liability, NET PLUS BENEFIT EXTRACTION POLICY, Risk & Public Liability of Tailings Dams, Risk Avoidance & Loss Prevention Metallic Mining, Risk Economics and Public Liability of Tailings Dam Failures, Tailings Dam Failures, Tailings Dam Risk Management, Tailings Failure Public Consequence Index, Tailings Risk Management, TSF Failures Consequence, TSF Risk Management, TSF Risk Profile Globally | Leave a comment

Path To Zero Failures “NET PLUS” Benefits In Mining Lies In Radical Reform of RESOURCE GOVERNANCE

The Following was addressed to Luke Fletcher, Executive Director of Jubilee Australia whose economics centered systematic approach to advocacy has always been exemplary and worthy of emulation.  Glad
to provide email contacts for those interested in following up with the several related recent in the news initiatives mentioned in the missive to Luke.
Lindsay Newland Bowker
Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest
LNBowkerAssociates.org
Dear Luke,
The quality, clarity, and precision of your analysis  sets a high bar for all of us.  As a body of work, the projects you highlight in this remarkable annual report are evolving universal  modern terms for resource management policy. As Jubilee Australia so wisely and beautifully models, it is in the redefinition of natural resources policy that the broad reforms we all seek in the name of “responsible mining” and “sustainable mining” will be achieved. That of course includes a complete revamping of attending  fiscal policy away from production volume only and toward a more  deeply informed policy on the distribution of costs and benefits.
Globally, as we map in our latest partnered work with David Chambers, present “production volume focused” policy  governing almost all legal frameworks and their attending fiscal policy has created a portfolio  in which less than 70% of all approved mines are actually capable of  production at all unless new higher grade discoveries are made or viable new technology emerges.  We have shown that mines that are not economically viable and were not viable at the time permits were issued (eg Mt Polley),are the main source  of the  world’s permanent catastrophic loss to culture, community, environment and impairment of other essential uses of land and water.
Since publishing a few weeks ago, I  saw and widely distributed  a research report  concluding that only 50% of the mines in the world’s‘pipeline of mines “in development” are actually needed to meet world needs for  metals, fertilizers and hydrocarbons.  The other 50% fostered and facilitated by  present prevailing legal frameworks is  only about speculation and profiteering and nothing to do with actual global needs.  The value that is added for speculators and profiteers is through the granting of the permit, the unfettered exchange of the permitted entity with its value adding  permit status intact and in the structure of law that allows the trade  not just of the extracted commodity but of the mine itself as “commodity”.
Our latest  findings suggest that every nation, every community can formulate a resource management policy on the terms you and others have begun to map out that in aggregate will supply all the metals, fertilizers and hydrocarbons the world needs within a “zero failures”, “zero harm” mandate. Perhaps you have seen Andrew Bauer’s ( Natural Resources Governance Institute) exemplary work on this kind of rethinking and revamping for the Northwest Territories in Canada.
Policy reforms, including the Mt Polley expert panel recommendations on tailings management and those parts of it endorsed in the recent UNEP report and the reformulation of Initiative For  Responsible Mining Assurance standards (now under leadership of two of the world biggest polluters)  that don’t address the need for a fundamental shift  on resource management policy  offer incomplete solutions that will not prepare us  for this new era of  low grade mining that is already well underway and for which there is no present  proven technical capacity.
You have gone a long way toward mapping the route and foundations needed for a the radical restructuring of law and policy we must accomplish to prepare for what lies ahead for the next two to three decades of human history and resource extraction.  You are right in your analysis of the deep flaws in the World Bank drafted Mining Law for Bougainville that sound resource management policy  begins with the granting of mineral rights  and the consideration of whether that use will benefit the local community  and fit harmoniously with that community’s overall vision of its own economic future.
 
Thank you, Luke. Thank You, Jubilee Australia!!!
 
Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager
Bowker Associates
Science & Research In The Public Interest
15 Cove Meadow Rd.
Stonington, Maine 04681
LNBowker@BowkerAssociates.org​
———- Forwarded message ———-
From: Jubilee Australia<inquiry@jubileeaustralia.org>
Date: Sun, Nov 19, 2017 at 8:00 PM
Subject: Jubilee Australia Helps Launch Australia Corporate Accountability Network …
To: Lindsay Newland Bowker <lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com>

Dear Lindsay,

Two weeks ago in Melbourne, Jubilee Australia was at RMIT in Melbourne for the launch of an exciting new project: the Australian Corporate Accountability Network.

Jubilee has played a crucial role in setting up this network and our Business and Human Rights Advisor Brynn O’Brien, who is on the network’s secretariat, addressed the launch event.

We have big hopes that this new project will be able to shine a brighter light and ultimately hold to account any Australian companies committing human rights violations and environmental damages either at home or overseas.

ACAN_Launch_RMIT_-_small.jpg

Caption: From left Michelle O’Neil (Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia) Catherine Coumans (Mining Watch Canada), Serena Lilywhite (Transparency International Australia) and Shelley Marshall (RMIT) discuss the potential for better corporate accountability in Australia.

 

Here is a snapshot of what we have already accomplished this year:

And here is just a few of the projects that we are working on now:

 

Stay tuned to hear more about all these issues in the near future. We can continue to carry on this important work with your generous continued support. All donations are tax deductible.

 

Luke Fletcher

Executive Director, Jubilee Australia

Jubilee Australia engages in research to seek reform of Australian government and corporate practices, and of the global financial system, to support community wellbeing and a just, sustainable, global economy.

Unsubscribe

Contact us:
PO Box 20885 World Square NSW 2002
Email: luke@jubileeaustralia.org
Website: www.jubileeaustralia.org

Lindsay Newland Bowker <lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com>

9:39 AM (4 minutes ago)

to david.winning
David,
Understand Rhiannon is still on maternity leave.  Her instructions are to forward to you.  Happy to assist on background, sources contacts of you are interested in this area and this subject.
Lindsay
Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager
Bowker Associates
Science & Research In The Public Interest
15 Cove Meadow Rd.
Stonington, Maine 04681
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Posted in Andrew Bauer, Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest, David M. Chambers, Jubilee Australia, Lindsay Newland Bowker, NET PLUS BENEFIT EXTRACTION POLICY, Resource Governance, Uncategorized, UNEP TAILINGS MANAGEMENT REFORMS | Leave a comment

Building Codes & Building Boards BEST MODEL For Regulatory Reform In Tailings Management

 

 

There are companies, consultants and regulators around the world that have a high level of commitment to tailings dam safety and have developed practices which have been instrumental in ensuring the safe operation of tailings dams by many companies in many countries. Their experience should be taken advantage of in striving to further improve industry’s performance through the development of a comprehensive Tailings Responsibility Code that will establish well defined standards of practice, provide detailed audit protocols and require third party audits, all of which should be made available to stakeholders in a transparent manner. Henry Brehaut Key Note Address Tailings& Mine Waste  2017 Banff Nov5-8 2017

 

Though there was too much industry control when the then existing UNEP Metals & Mining  division created the cyanide code to address public alarm at the frequency and consequence of cyanide heap leach failures and head off outright cyanide bans, I do believe that a mutually informed all stakeholders code in local/national law that does as the Mt Polley Panel advised  and UNEP has endorsed  to put  safety first is the way to go.  Global organizations need some uniformity in code and regulation to function.

 

The legal model that works best for that is  the universally familiar  “buildings code” model  under a separate enforcement and oversight structure.  That is what Tailings Management needs..not just for tailings dams but for all means of deposition. That model works through a legally established building code with checks and balances in its  governance and enforcement structure.

Through buildings codes and professionally staffed Buildings Departments urban areas have accommodated ever higher buildings and ever more creative engineering designs for high rises that provide for innovation and advancement and a means of always being in tune with innovation & advancement through code revisions and the statutorily provided  process for that.

 

The Buildings Codes/Building Department model  forces accountability to best practice, to the costs of  managing tailings to best practice and to a means of insuring that best practice keeps pace with innovation and new research . 

 

The Buildings Code/Buildings Department model also works for investors, insurers , sureties and lenders as it provides a built in “underwriting” process  where  competence and ongoing professional development of all inspectors and each key position is defined in law.

 

I recently heard from a research team looking at how to reorient taxation for mines to better capture revenue and fund capacity focused on the public liability center of mining..its waste management practices.

 

Together these two shifts in public policy would more or less cure the loss prevention dilemma built into almost all the legal code for mining world wide.

 

The big question, is where is the professional capacity to make this work. ?  Does it actually exist presently within top producing companies with major international tailings portfolios, let alone regionally resident in adequate numbers relative  to the size of existing and planned tailings facility portfolios?

 

Jack Cadwell has written that even among the top 40 there are  too few qualified tailings management engineers to cover a given company’s global portfolio of  tailings facilities and that many, like BHP as of Samarco, have non at all relying completely on consultants .  In the long dry time prior the supercycle  professional competence was stripped to bare bones everywhere.  As we lay out piece by piece in our new paper the industry globally  gave us all time highs in consequence by rushing to maximum production from this bare bones place.

 

I wonder in the agenda or in lunch discussions there at Tailings 2017  whether is any actual  realization of this massive gap in technical competence or any plans afoot on how to build it?  Is anyone talking about how to build  professional development and competence to enforce and oversee an international tailings code?

 

 

 

 

 

Posted in Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest, Henry Brehaut, Jack Caldwell, Lindsay Newland Bowker, Mt Polley Expert Panel Reccommendations, Tailings & Waste Management 2017, Tailings Legal Reform, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM TAILINGS MANAGEMENT REFORMS SHOULD BE PUBLICLY  ACCEPTED BY MAC & ICMM AND PRESENTED AT TAILINGS 2017

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  Stonington Maine November 1, 2017

CONTACT: Lindsay Newland Bowker, LNBowker@BowkerAssociates.org +1 207 367 5145

TAGS: UNEP Tailings Management Report; Reform Of Legal Framework for Tailings Facilities; Tailings Conference 2017; 2nd Anniversary Samarco TSF Failure; Mt Polley TSF Failure Management & Closures; Mining Watch Canada; London Mining Network; Amnesty International;Tailings Risk Management

Last week  the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) released its call for reforms in the legal framework for oversight of tailings facilities. The report was endorsed by an international coalition of NGO’s who have been active for many years providing competent and thorough documentation on local public consequence from many aspects of mining activities.  The endorsing coalition included Mining Watch Canada, The London Mining Network and Amnesty International.   The report comes after  two  years of non-governmental response to the full program of reform recommended by the Mt. Polley expert panel. Here at this forum are several posts chronicling in some detail the response avoidance initiatives  of the Mining Association of Canada ( MAC) the International Council on Mining & Metals ( ICMM) and even the British Columbia government itself who sought the recommendations when it commissioned the Mt Polley panel.

The catastrophic failures phenomenon is world wide as illustrated in the spectacular graphic superimposing  failures by severity on a map of the world. As as we document in our latest research in partnership with Dave Chambers, scale of impact  of catastrophic failures has reached all new magnitude and the highest frequency of occurrence ever.   No  government in the world has enacted any meaningful reforms either.

Bowker Associates  had no part in developing the UNEP report or writing its promotion  though our data base ( Bowker Chambers TSF Failures 1915-2017 was the source of reported data and charts.  We are very glad of, and wholly endorse this united global expression of refusal to accept the program of non reform held fast by MAC, ICMM and all nations but Australia who offer many excellent models all should look to.

This step of united global expression of the public interest has claimed global ownership of  the narrative on public interest consequence, including human rights and social consequence, especially to the lands and communities of indigenous peoples.  The coalition is at work continually in a living collaboration but this is the first formal public expression  Of widely shared views and advocacy.  And of course UNEP is a natural global umbrella for that united advocacy.

Neither the mining industry, its lobbies MAC and ICMM nor any government  with an active  resource policy in support of mining can debate or duck the four main UNEP calls for action by governments issuing permits: (1) call for an official public policy of loss prevention with a goal of zero failures ;( 2) the Mt Polley core mandate of safety above economics and cost as a foundation stone of all public policy; (3) the obligation of each government issuing permits to provide a complete available on demand public data base on all tailings facilities under their jurisdiction; (4) the obligation to provide checks and balances protective of the public interest through independent expert review of all aspects of facility design management oversight and closure especially  with a bearing on public liability and public consequence.
There is great and reasonable frustration in the public interest sector globally that ICMM, and MAC and governments like BC Ministry of Mines have taken a watered down chinese menu approach to the wisdom of the Mt Polley Panel recommendations .  The core recommendations cited above are based on the Mt Polley expert panel reccommendations. As Dave Chambers & I warn  in our industry peer reviewed new paper just published in Environments , the continued avoidance of a full commitment to all the Mt Polley recommendations as policy in all legal frameworks will just spawn a wider tide of reactive populist anti mining legislation as was just brought into existence by a state wide coalition of NGO’s here in Maine( LD820).
Mining Watch Canada, who have been the gold standard for impeccably good research  as the foundation for their advocacy, has already endorsed  the same reactive populist call as Maine for upfront security  in the amount of a worst case scenario  That is not a worthy advocacy but it reflects popular thinking and is what the mining industry will continue to invite  if it doesn’t heed  the call for every nation to reframe its law from scratch embracing the 4 foundation stones advocated by UNEP and the full menu of Mt Polley recommendations, not just for new projects but in application to all existing TSF’s and ATDS( Alternative Tailings Deposition, such as in pit or underground workings deposition, use of caves or natural underground openings, use of marine environments ( lakes, rivers, streams, bays and ocean)).
 The Mt Polley expert panel did not address human rights and social impacts reforms or the need for miner funded immediate mobilization for relief , assistance and compensation in the wake of catastrophic failure because they were working under a framework  that contractually focused their  scope.  UNEP is the first government entity to demand that all legal frameworks for mining  include creation of a global disaster relief fund, presumably miner funded and contributions mandated by law in all permits.
This is UNEP’s central mandate all over the world and they were on the ground and present post Samarco as a voice of truth against the manufactured narrative in the wake of the Samarco man made disaster in Brazil.  I had advocated here in Maine that companies on government divestment lists and on the World Banks “black list” be specifically disallowed as applicants or having any control or directive role in any aspect of mine operations.  Had I been involved in the preparation of this report I would have recommended that inclusion.
Bowker Associates endorses a more complete legal framework in all permitting regulations addressing human rights , including locally expressed standards  of community and environmental security and requiring a fair level of contribution via the local government to emergency response for all high hazard facilities. Spill response laws are not adequately conceived or framed to respond to catastrophic tailings facility failures.
Each of the main endorsing NGOS ( London Mining Network, Mining Watch Canada and Amnesty International) have done work of impeccable quality in documenting mine specific public interest consequences of mining practice and Bowker Associates fully embraces their consensus on these mandates of reform in all legal frameworks for mining.
I was very glad to see Mining.com’s brief but balanced coverage  of the UNEP report and it has been reported in several other mining  media as well including investment analysts websites.
It would move the conversation and the continuing informed mapping of the public interest if  MAC and ICMM immediately concede and endorse these five  main recommendations in advance of, and at , Tailings 2017, Alberta November 5-8.
Jack Caldwell has updated his planned presentation in recognition of the UNEP, including its global map of failures post Mt Polley and in recognition of our latest paper.
Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager
Bowker Associates
Science & Research In The Public Interest
15 Cove Meadow Rd.
Stonington, Maine 04681
LNBowker@BowkerAssociates.org

 

Posted in Analysis TSF Failures, BHP, Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest, Brazil Tailings Dam Failure Risk, Canadian Mine Risk & Loss Profile, Catatrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Causes Of Catastrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Center For Science in Citizen Participation, David M. Chambers, Environmental Risk Management, financial risk and public liability, Fundao Talings Dam, Germano Tailings Dam Failure, GO NO-GO Technical Framework, Jack Caldwell, MAC/CDA Tailings Guidelines, Measuring Magnitude of Consequence TSF Failures, Minas Gerais Mining Oversight, Mine Disaster Recovery, Mine Risk Management, mineral economics, Mining Watch Canada, Mt Polley TSF Failure, Mt. Polley, Public Liability & Financial Risk, Rate of Raise for Upstream Tailings Dams, Uncategorized, UNEP TAILINGS MANAGEMENT REFORMS | Leave a comment

TSUNAMI OF PHOSPHATE TAILINGS FROM ICL PLANT INUNDATE 20KM OF DRY VALLEY NEAR DEAD SEA

ICLfailure6302017israel

A collapsed wall of a reservoir holding a highly acidic wastewater is seen in Mishor Rotem, in Southern Israel July 4, 2017. REUTERS/Baz Ratner

 

June 30th, MISHOR ROTEM ISRAEL

 

“Toxic wastewater that surged through a dry riverbed in southern Israel at the weekend left a wake of ecological destruction more than 20 km (12 miles) long.

“The flood began last Friday when the 60 meter (yard) high wall of a reservoir at a phosphate factory partially collapsed, letting loose 100,000 cubic meters (26.4 million gallons) of highly acidic wastewater in the Ashalim riverbed. One section of the Ashalim riverbed is made up of narrow canyons, popular for hiking, but no one was around when the wastewater first gushed through”

 

“Israel’s Ministry of Environment has opened a criminal investigation into the plant’s owner, Rotem Amfert, and its parent company Israel Chemicals (ICL), a leading potash and fertilizer producer with exclusive rights in Israel to mine the Dead Sea.

“All the plants and animals in the valley during the tsunami of acid were probably highly damaged, probably dead,” said Oded Netzer, an ecologist for the ministry. “In the long term, there will be soil damage and large functional ecological problems.”

He said weeks of intense clean-up work, including pumping out small pools of the wastewater that remain along the path, lay ahead, and complete rehabilitation would likely take years.

ICL has stopped using the series of reservoirs where the breech occurred. They contained a production by-product called phosphogypsum water.

The company declined to answer questions on the criminal investigation or about the impact the incident will have on its operations.

Shares in ICL fell almost 4 percent after the spill but partially recovered to trade 1.3 percent higher on Tuesday.

In a statement, Rotem Amfert said it was working “around the clock” in full coordination with authorities, and it would spare no resources to clean up the riverbed.” Ari Rabinovitch for Reuters, July 5th http://www.reuters.com/news/archive/environmentNews

“Israel Chemicals first identified the spill at 11:45 a.m. on Friday (June 30, 2017), after workers found a hole in the eastern embankment of the Rotem Afert plaster pools, which allowed “plaster water” to leak into both pool #4 at the factory and part of Nahal Ashalim, the company said. Plant workers arrived quickly and stopped operations of the relevant facility and the sewage flow, the statement added.

“On Saturday afternoon, the INPA said its teams were scanning areas along a 20-km. strip from the Mishor Rotem area to the Ashalim reservoir, which included numerous basins created by “the tremendous sewage flow.” The flow was so strong at times that water levels reached as high as 4 meters in some of the channels, the authority reported.

“At the same time, inspectors were working to keep animals away from the water and prevent the entry of hikers, because the conditions could be very dangerous to them, the INPA warned. As of late afternoon, the authority said there was still considerable sewage flow in many of the streambed’s channels, as well as a large amount of foam and sludge forming in the very wide opening of the channel.

icl6302017israel3Meanwhile, the Environmental Protection Ministry said it had ordered the Rotem Afert factory to cease pumping wastewater into its pools until the ministry is convinced that such an event would not reoccur.

“We estimate that we will complete the samples and measures in the field by the end of the day, and then we will be able to complete the mapping and estimate the initial damage in order to examine and plan with the rest of the authorities how to continue to handle the area from this point on,” Gilad Gabbai, director of the INPA’s southern region, said on Saturday.

“It is important to emphasize to travelers that they should not come to the area until further notice, because it could be very dangerous for them. We estimate that the rehabilitation in the field will take at least a few weeks.” Jersusalem Post   Read more: http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/tsunami-of-toxic-wastewater-inundates-israel-desert-over-weekend/article/496912#ixzz4m5qUa6On

PHOSPHATE TAILINGS A GREATER RISK & GREATER CHALLENGE THAN METALLIC TAILINGS

Here is a description of the process and some of the difficulties managing “plaster pools” as they are often called during operations and how difficult they are to close. A ton of tailings is create for every ton of phosphate produced.

http://www.fipr.state.fl.us/about-us/phosphate-primer/process-water/

“If one of the operating plants is shut down and it is necessary to close the phosphogypsum stack and pond water system, the water in inventory must be treated before it can be discharged. The volume of water that would need to be treated could be as much as 2 to 3 billion gallons. The process water has a low pH of about 1 to 2 and contains a dilute mixture of phosphoric, sulfuric, and fluosilicic acids. It is saturated with calcium sulfate and contains numerous other ions found in the phosphate rock used as a raw material, as well as ammonia from the solid fertilizer manufacturing process.

ICL6302017israel2.png

A Re Examination of How We Provide Phosphates For Fertilizers

http://phosphorusfutures.net/the-phosphorus-challenge/the-story-of-phosphorus-8-reasons-why-we-need-to-rethink-the-management-of-phosphorus-resources-in-the-global-food-system/

Israel Has Lower Grades & Higher Costs Than Other Phosphate Producing Nations

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadw835.PDF

ICL Has Implemented a Filter Press Back Fill System At Its Boulby Mine In Cleveland UK

http://www.tailings.info/casestudies/clevelandpotash.htm

Andrew Fourie’s latest paper is on the use of Potash tailings for backfill but we have not had an opportunity to read it.  Due to cost, Boulby did not use any other fillers.  A recent study presented at Marrakesh 2011 concluded that Portland cement was an essential component to the successful long term performance of potash based backfill.

Deposition of phosphate slurry into the sea was common practice until the use of the tailings impoundments .

In the U.S. the western states use underground extraction where backfill might work but in the eastern U.S. most extraction has been by open pit.

There Are Alternatives to Semi Liquid Deposition of Phosphate  Tailings

http://www.golder.com/sa/en/modules.php?name=Publication&sp_id=238&page_id=&service_id=53

 

 

Phosphate Tailings Have a Higher Severity Profile Than Metals Floatation Tailings

The ostensible goal of all slurry deposition of tailings is a dry stack within the impoundment that is stable, non permeable and without seepages. Metal slurries are 68% solid, however, phosphate slurries are only about 3% solid at deposition and never attain a dry state with its own internal structural integrity. As compared with most metal slurries from concentrators, phosphate slurries are characteristically more toxic.

Classified as “Serious” per Bowker Chambers severity classifications based on the described “100,000 M3” release . Images and descriptions suggest a much larger total releases volume. By the Rico-Benito formula the estimate is in the range 700,000 to 1 million m3 for a 60 meter high dam with a 20km runout.

 

Timeline  Details on Criminal Investigation Of  Rotem Afert

http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/ResourcesandServices/NewsAndEvents/NewsAndMessageDover/Pages/2017/07-July/Acid-Spill-Causes-Ecological-Disaster-in-Judean-Desert.aspx

This link includes video of the release as it occurred and images of the scoured river bed.

The MoEP has launched a criminal investigation against managers from Rotem Amfert and its parent company, Israel Chemicals Ltd. This after a hearing was held at the MoEP’s Southern District office, headed by Baruch Weber.

The Ministry’s Green Police will lead the probe, which will include series of investigative actions against corporate officers.

During the hearing, ways in which the Rotem Fertilizers plant could refrain from activities that could cause additional environmental damage were examined. It should be noted that the MoEP ordered the immediate discontinuance of the use of evaporation ponds 1 to 3, where the collapse occurred. The MoEP has ordered the use of a temporary pond until it is satisfied that the factory’s operations will not create additional environmental hazards.”

 

 

 

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Will add more information on history & severity of phosphate tailings failures in history and add correct photo credits for the two additional photos above. Will also post here new information as it develops including on the criminal investigation of ICL subsidiary Rotem Afert for  this failure.

 

 

 

 

Posted in ICL Waste Dam Failure, Mishor Rotem Israel, Phosphate Tailings Failures, Rotem Afert Crminal Investigation, Rotem Amfert Nedev, Rotem Arfert, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

AS METALLIC MINING ENTERS ALL NEW ERA OF UN MAPPED DIMENSIONS AND OUTCOMES FATE OF SOME 30% OF ALL “ACTIVE” MINES NEVER VIABLE OR PRESENTLY NOT VIABLE ACCRUING PORTFOLIO OF PUBLIC RISK HANGS UNEXAMINED AND UNADDRESSED

In the shadow of the “supercycle”,[1] and propelled by its dysfunctional economic dynamics, risk and public liability from mine tailings storage facility (TSF) failures have reached all-time highs. The annual failure rate for significant TSF events has escalated from a 50-year average of 0.56 “Very Serious“[2] TSF failures per year (33/50) to 1.0 (10/10) for the period of price run up 2000-2010 as described by the HHWI (Rossen, Anja 2015), a 78% increase. In this period, copper prices steadily climbed reaching an all-time post war3 high of $9411 per ton ($2015) in 2011 as compared to the prior 50 year average price of $5133. These facts challenge the widely held notion that failures are mainly shaped by falling prices. They point to more fundamental and still not fully examined or understood root causes of TSF failures.

 

What is apparent in the forensic record is that the increasing severity and frequency of high consequence failures reflects in part an aging infrastructure at depleted mines which are no longer economically viable even at record high prices. There are also indications that many were never viable and were just abetted into existence through venture capital on loosely regulated exchanges or advanced on faulty feasibility studies.

What seems apparent and even widely understood within the industry, though not yet widely acknowledged, is that we have reached the outer limit of the mining industry’s long standing metric that ever lower grades of ores can be mined through “economies of scale”. A close examination of the data seems to show that the “mining metric”[3] stopped working sometime in the mid 90’s. It is from this turning point in the efficacy of the mining metric that conditions which evolve to catastrophic failure began forming, incubating and progressing. During the supercycle as prices climbed to all-time post war highs, grades, even at major producing large mines, dropped to all-time lows. Meanwhile mines still premised on this economies of scale model continue to be put forward with unverifiable claims of economic viability, or with a reasonable expectation of full compliance with external environmental and other community protective standards.

The data increasingly dictate that we need a completely new approach to navigate this new era of mining. We need action to identify and correct already accrued public liability the end of this era has left behind in standing operating TSFs. This can only be accomplished through the application of comprehensive law and policy addressed to these two imperatives. The fragmented legal frameworks for mining in most prevalent use today globally have conclusively demonstrated their failure to adequately protect the public interest. Post Mt. Polley, and now post Fundão, none of the much publicized government and industry studies and reforms announced address the key root causes of high severity high consequence tailings failures or commit to any changes in law and policy that will be effective in preventing the man made losses in existing, not yet closed marginal mines.

This is the introduction for our soon to be released new research on how the longest and biggest price rise in recorded history created the biggest elevation ever in portfolio risk , not just on the public liability side as measured in trends of TSF failures but on the investment side as well.

Here are a few of the highlights of the dysfunctional and damaging economics of the supercycle.

 

The Co-Entanglement of Supercycle Economics & TSF Failures

 

It is irrefutable that the frequency and consequence of Very Serious Failures and of “Serious”[4] Failures is continuing to increase at alarming rates, that the trend emerged and grew post 1990 and that it is in large part a consequence of conscious decisions made at the mine-level to make up for fundamental mine and miner specific economic disadvantages viz global economics. Short cuts on waste management, especially of tailings management, were and are a fast, easy, under the radar way to try to meet the high production volumes and low cash costs investors insist on (Bowker & Chambers 2015, Bowker & Chambers 2016).

 

The dysfunctional, reactive economics of the supercycle are expertly analyzed and well characterized by Deloitte in their 2014 market trend analysis.In their relentless pursuit of growth in response to pressure from investors and analysts, companies developed massive project pipelines. Some also developed marginal mines, hoping commodity prices would buoy poor project economics. In their headlong pursuit of volume, many mining companies abandoned their focus on business fundamentals. They compromised capital allocation decision making in the belief that strong commodity prices would compensate for weak business practices. Rather than maintaining a long-term view of the market, many acted opportunistically.”(Deloitte 2014).

Price Waterhouse Coopers, looking at the performance of the top 40 over the supercycle, note that much of the massive commitment of capital to expansion and production at any cost ended up as impairment write offs: “… from 2010-2015, the top 40 have impaired the equivalent of a staggering 32% of the capex incurred”. They note that $36 billion, or 68 % of the total impairments, were taken by Glencore, Freeport Vale and Anglo American and that “2015 saw the first widescale mothballing of marginal projects”. The top 40 took a collective net loss of $27 billion and investors punished them for “squandering the benefits of boom” and for “poor capital management and investment decisions“. (PWC 2016).

It is in this dysfunctional “maximum production at any cost” dynamic of the supercycle that we see a dramatic upturn in the frequency and severity of failures, and in which there is with very little doubt a higher global portfolio risk of accrued and unexamined public liability. Changes in waste rock to metals ratios for gold suggest the possibility of a more than 100% increase in the level of potential unexamined risk (SRS Rocco 2016).

The amount of capital just wasted during the supercycle would have gone a very very long way to correcting everything that needs correcting in all the pollution generating waste piles in all the mines in the world.  Instead it just became investor losses and unfunded mine catastrophe’s .
To achieve stability and a lower public liability profile the system does need to be cleansed of the 30% to 50% of mines that are no longer viable.  That is in the public interest.  That is a necessity for the mining industry.
To protect the public and communities in the sacrifice zone of potential catastrophe’s that cleansing has to be planned and orderly. The permitting jurisdictions who abetted these mines into existence need to share some of the financial risk and responsibility for this essential cleansing.  It cant just be a big shuffle of public risk to less and less competent, less and less well financed  or less reputable mine operators.

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[1] Supercycle refers to a multi-year period of sustained price increases in commodities and raw materials.

[2] We define “Very Serious” TSF failures as those involving a release of 1 million cubic meters or more

3 The all-time annual average high since 1896 was 1916 at $13,572 ($2015) followed by 1917 at $11,876

[3] The “mining metric” is higher mine production necessitated by lower grades of ore, a century of declining prices offset by declining costs per ton. The metric is to continuously develop the resource through economies of scale, larger and deeper footprints, more efficient operations, bigger and better bulk mining technology.

[4] We define “Serious” TSF failures as those with a release of greater than 100,000 m3, but less than 1 million m3.

 

 

Posted in Analysis TSF Failures, Measuring Magnitude of Consequence TSF Failures, mineral economics, Resources Policy, TSF Failures, TSF Failures Consequence, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Root Causes of Tailings Dam Overtopping: The Economics of Risk & Consequence

Root Causes of Tailings Dam Overtopping: The Economics of Risk & Consequence

Lindsay Newland Bowker1 and David M. Chambers2

1Bowker Associates Science & Research in the Public Interest 15 Cove Meadow Rd Stonington, Maine 04681 USA lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com

2Center for Science in Public Participation 224 N. Church Ave. Bozeman, Montana 59715 USA Email: dchambers@csp2.org

ABSTRACT

This paper examines overtopping failures of embankments at tailings impoundments from 1915-2015 and compares the severity of consequence for overtopping failures to that of other causes of failure. We find that the distribution by severity of consequence for overtopping at active mines is not significantly different from any of the other established “causes of failure.” Further we find that the distribution by severity within and across all active TSF recorded failure causes (N=125) is also reflected in the mean distribution of severity for all of our recorded TSF failures (N=267) suggesting that a common root cause, rather than the individual causes of failure, may determine the severity of failure. We look here at the demonstrated link between severity of consequence of failure and the economic dynamics of the “Mining Metric” over 100 years (Bowker and Chambers 2015) as it applies to overtopping. We offer what is available from authoritative sources on the economics backstory of known overtopping failures and crises. We conclude that the deviations from best available technology and best applicable practices at the mine level are conscious choices driven by economics and that without a reframing of the professional, regulatory, and legal frameworks for mining these choices will continue to be made even where proven technology and new promising technology are available and better suited to a given mining asset. Solutions that will prevent mine failure require not only the work of evolving consensus on best available technology/best applicable practices, but also the recognition of root causes which build to catastrophic failure. A complete solution cannot be attained without accountability to best knowledge, best practice, best effective technology in mining law and regulation, as permit standards, as standards for oversight for life-of-mine and of life-of-tailings storage facilities.

rootcauses fig1

 

The BC Ministry of Energy and Mines, like most regulatory agencies, allows the dual use of the facility for storage of water. In May, 2014, prior to the dam failure, there had been an overtopping of the dam, but quick action by mine personnel prevented failure of the dam (Mt Polley Expert Panel 2015). Overtopping at Mt Polley could also have led to a dam failure, with similar damage as eventually occurred in the foundation failure in August in 2014.

 

Throughout Canada and all over the world new mines and new dams are approved within regulatory and legal structures that do not hold miners to best available technology and best applicable practices.  Until this changes, it is clear that the industry will not consistently choose best available technology and best applicable practices unless required to do so. Geoffrey Blight emphasizes this in his authoritative and informed re-visitation of several notorious failures, among his very last works and summing a life time of excellence and insight on design and management of tailings storage facilities (Blight 2010).

 

rootcauses tab1.png

 

  • Economic Root Causes of Well Known Overtopping Failures: Grade as a Key Root Determinant

 

The fundamentals of how this plays at the mine level is simply and succinctly expressed by Andrey Dashkov, Senior Analyst, Casey Research: “As a project moves to the development stage, the higher the grade, the more robust the projected economics of a project. And for a mine in production, the higher the grade, the more technical sins and price fluctuations it can survive.” (Dashkov 2013). Continuing in this analysis Dashkov goes on to declare that volume and throughput (the Scholz foundation for profitability of low grade mines) is “no longer king,” and that grade is “now king” in determining which mines will be successful and which will fail. This was essentially validated by Bowker and Chambers (2015) as the context and main driver of the emerging prevalence of catastrophic failure. This applies equally to failure by any of the 8 causes of failure, including overtopping.

 

Dashkov’s analysis that a grade advantage is a critical determinant of ability to survive serious technical flubs and dramatic unpredictable price fluctuations, a norm for all metals, means that smaller, lower grade mines will suffer more and have more physical manifestations of their economic stress than larger, higher grade mines. Very simply, smaller, lower grade mines operated by junior and midsize miners have no cushion. They have to ride too close to the edge of financial viability viz. global metals markets and major producers to stay in production. They also have less access to high quality capital markets, paying more and operating under more onerous terms of credit than the top producers at higher grade mines, a factor that George Ireland has frequently cited as creating financial instability and uncertainty when the due dates of credit don’t match up with cash flows needs, expected revenue generation, and production capacities of the mine. This mismatch can actually lead to failure or involuntary investor takeover elevating uncertainty and instability (Sylvester 2012).

 

In gold, as a respected analyst Mark Fellows explains, a 10% fall in global average ore grade gives rise to a $50/oz rise in average global production costs (Fellows 2010). At the mine level, a difference between a gold mine with 1.72g/t and 2.2 g/t translates to a likely cost difference of $100/oz in total production costs. These are the actual differences at the Gold Ridge mine, Guadalcanal, in 2009. This mine never achieved profitability, not because of political unrest, but because the low quality of the deposit compared to the quality of ores shaping world markets. Gold Ridge, with a 20 million cubic meter capacity tailings storage facility with a long history of many owners, frequent interruptions, and continually falling recovery rates (another emerging consequence of mining very low grade ores), under ownership of landowners with no technical competence, has hovered on the brink of complete failure by overtopping for two years. Blight and Fourie (2004), George Ireland (Sylvester 2012) and Irwin Wislesky (Moore 2016), among others, all cite technical competence, technical mistakes, and caliber of mine operators as an unexamined and significant back drop to mine failures.

1.      CONCLUSIONS

 

As we see most stunningly at Samarco’s largest failure ever in recorded history, without clear standards in law and regulation viz. best available technology and best applicable practices, and adequate competent independent life of facility oversight, efforts to attain profitability will continue to lead to choices at the mine level that can eventually lead to catastrophic loss. As we see at Mt Polley, that eventual catastrophe could emerge as any one of several causes of loss. Mt Polley could have been an overtopping failure of the same magnitude as the foundation failure. Samarco’s Fundao dam, it is important to note, was only put in service in 2009, had an Independent Tailings Review Board, and highly regarded expert advisers. In British Columbia, Imperial Metals was found not to be in violation of any law and regulation, even though its economically driven deviations from best available technology and best applicable practices culminated one as one of the 10 largest failures ever in recorded history. Similar economic forces and economically driven decision making that maximize throughput have shaped the wrong choices that have led to very serious failures throughout recorded history.

 

… a better understanding of causes of loss establishes a basis for intervention in time to prevent tailings dam failures. If we can recognize the early warning signs that could evolve to catastrophic loss, we will be able to address actions and changes to prevent that ultimate manifestation.

We can expect future losses to routinely exceed the severity of Mt. Polley. With so many very large upstream tailings dams in use and continuing to be authorized, we can also expect others to fail at the scale of Samarco, a very small impoundment compared to others standing ,in operation ( and planned).

 In this paper we are suggesting that best available technology and best applicable practices must be partnered with reforms in law and regulation, and an awareness of the role of economics.to build solutions that will save investors, communities, and natural resources from the un fundable damages of catastrophic failure at super-sized tailings storage facilities. If permits continue to be given to mines that are not economically competitive in the present and emerging global markets, even with apparent or agreed compliance with best available technology and best applicable practices, there will be economic pressure on mine operators to bend the rules.

 

 

 

Keywords: overtopping failures, embankments, tailings impoundments, severity of consequence of failure , resource policy, mineral economics

 

 

Full text of paper :

Protections 2016 2nd International Seminar on  Dam Protection Against Overtopping ISBN: 978-1-1889143-27-9

 

https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/179793/CONF_2nd_Protections_2016_8-24.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y

Posted in Analysis TSF Failures, Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest, Canadian Mine Risk & Loss Profile, Catatrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Causes Of Catastrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Center For Science In Public Participation, CSP2, CU Average Grade 1910 2010, CU Average Ore Production 1910 2010, CUCosts of Production 1910 2010, David M. Chambers, financial risk and public liability, mineral economics, resource policy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

MT POLLEY BEYOND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF FAILURE: Pre Failure Economics

Beyond “proximate cause”, the focus of most dam committee reports,  are the root economic causes of most catastrophic failures.  Imperial Metals had two principle mines, Huckleberry and Mt Polley that never achieved profitability and were developed and run on “shoe string” economics from the outset.

Writing in the cover to the 2000 Imperial Metals annual report , then CEO and Chair Murray Edwards ;”

“While both mines have been a technical success, they have yet to generate the financial returns that were expected when they were given the go ahead for construction in 1996, on the assumption that long term metal prices would be US$1/lb for copper and US$380/oz for gold.”

In 1996 the global average cu grade was .79 ( 1.26 weighted average grade) while grade at Mt Polley was .35.   The CU Equivalent for Mt Polley taking into account other metals mined and processed was only 0.5 as compared with a Cu Equivalent of 300 copper mines over roughly this same period of over 2.0(Per Aguirregabiria & Luengo 2016).  (http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1465230.files/copper_mining_victor_27112014.pdf)

 (The Aguirregabiria & Luengo is the first research we have seen taking full account of the role of  metals  other than copper in production volumes at copper mines.  In their sample of 300 copper mines representing 85% of copper production globally, other metals accounted for abut 25% of equivalent cu production volume  and value.  Mt Polley, with both a very substandard primary ( CU) grade also had a very limited added value in other metals.  Their profile of the 300 by “realized grade” (ie Cu equivalent) puts Mt Polley at about  the 25%percentile whereas  even any mine below a 50% percentile level would be marginal and struggling to stay alive and in production)

 

The 2000 annual report acknowledged  falling grades and its spiraling economic impacts on overall performance and profitability: 

 

 “The average grade of both copper and gold mined during the year was down from 1999 levels resulting in lower metal production. In 2000, 34.2 million pounds of copper and 83,194 ounces of gold were produced, compared to 37.1 million pounds of copper and 99,585 ounces of gold in 1999.  Improved copper prices and a weaker Canadian dollar were not sufficient to offset lower metal production in 2000. Operating revenues were $94.4 million and operating loss was $9.6 million compared to operating  revenues of $98.1 million and operating loss of $2.4 million in 1999”.

 mt-polley-pre-failure-economics

The NI43101 prepared for the re-opening in 2005 after 4 years in stand-by ( 2001-2005) was  by in house geologists based on a limited drilling program which had indicated a potential higher grade zone prior to standby.  The re-enrty involved no re examination or independent expert review of economic feasibility.  Stated expectations were never achieved.

 

Meanwhwile things got worse at Huckleberry also as a result of falling/inadequate grades according the 2007 annual report:

“Mill feed at Huckleberry is now sourced exclusively from the Main Zone Extension pit. This pit will extend mine life to the year 2010 but annual production will be reduced as the copper grade there is approximately 0.35% compared to historic grades of nearly 0.5%.”

 

The chart above is for the re-opening period pre-failure, 2005-2013. Recovery rates were low and uneven averaging 0.71.  Expected grades were no better than the pre standby brief operating period 1997-2001.

 

Life of mine to failure, the “Very Serious” failure rate for Mt Polley is .011 per million tonnes of ore to the mill vs .0004 globally, that is 27 times higher than the global failure performance..

 

Operations at both Huckleberry and Sterling, Imperials in situ leaching project in the States, have ceased further impairing Imperials frail and declining economic condition.

 

In 2014 BC MOM approved Mt Milligan a very low grade deposit in the same area and having the same profile. It has a CU EQ of only 0.45, even lower than the Mt Polley re-opening period 2005-2013. It uses outmoded slurry deposition in its centerline TSF designed by Knight Piesold

 

Red Chirs, Imperials only other operating mine is operating with a water cover on tailings completely contrary to the stern and precise warning of the Mt Polley expert panel that stability concerns trump ARD generation in the sense that a method used to suppress ARD generation is not acceptable if it undermines stability of the structure containing the ARD generating materials.

Although the Mt Polley expert panel did address the specific importance of proven economic feasibility, QPO ( Quantitative Performance Objectives) and the need for checks and balances and standards/limitations on the invocation of “the Observational Method” ( responses in the field to changing or unexpected conditions) no part of this has been addressed discussed or responded to as reform of the regulatory framework in British Columbia, elsewhere in Canada or anywhere else..

 

Bowker Associates has long and repeatedly called for a financial audit of all still permitted and active ( i.e.not safely and permanently closed) mines . BC and other mining jurisdictions need to examine accept responsibility for accruing public liability risk, possible  already formed failure conditions under the control of miners who can barely manage to stay in production at all and have never attained profitable operations.

  

This report sourced all data on Mt Polley entirely from Imperial Metals annual reports and from its NI43 101.

 

Lindsay Newland Bower, CPCU,ARM, Environmental Risk Manager

 

 

 

 

 

Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager

Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest

 

15 Cove Meadow Rd.

Stonington, Maine 04681

 

207 367 5145

 

lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com

lindsaynewlandbowker.wordpress.com

Posted in Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest, Catastrophic Tailings Failures, Causes Of Catastrophic Tailings Dam Failures, Environmental Risk Management, financial risk and public liability, Imperial Metals, Lindsay Newland Bowker, Mine Feasibility, Mining Economics, mining environmental risk management, Mining Financial Feasibility, Mining Regulation, Mt. Polley, Risk & Public Liability of Tailings Dams, Risk Avoidance & Loss Prevention Metallic Mining, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

ICMM ISSUES SELF SERVING REPORT ON TAILINGS MANAGEMENT PRESERVING STATUS QUO

CONTACT: Lindsay Newland Bowker, Bowker Associates lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com

DATE Of Release: December 5, 2016

 

Today ICMM ( “The International Council on Mining & Metals”) issued its report on Tailings Management. Written by Golder Associates who played a major role in the PR for Mt Polley and Samarco, the report is on behalf of ICMM’s 23 members who are the largest miners in the world controlling more than 2/3 of all production globally.

http://www.icmm.com/publications/pdfs/2016/161205_golder-associates_review-of-tailings-management-guidelines.pdf

It is really more a PR document attempting to assure investors and the public that its 23 large members have been following and continue to follow all best practice standards for tailings design and management.  There is nothing in it that recognizes the elevated levels of catastrophic tailings loss  globally not just as forecast but as evidenced in the record . There is nothing offered that addresses root causes or solutions.

summary-of-failures-data-base-increasing-severity

 

This is pretty  much as expected from ICMM and from Golder who have become more a mega PR firm, a “fixer” for  big miners in the wake of big disasters. Golder’s is  very different voice  when its client is the  World Bank or the IFC.

 

This report  is  on a parr with the superficial   response and reassurance given by BC MOM in its directed re evaluation of all B.C Tailings Facilities.  What was actually directed and the information actually produced did nothing to actually assess the level of risk in BC MOM’s standing operating already permitted TSF’s

 

FALSELY STATES HISTORIC RECORD OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURES

This report falsely states the historic record on TSF failures still quoting that tired old worn out 21 year old ICOLD stat that the  mining industry insists on as its meme : “2 significant failures occur per year”. Historically and in  the most recent decade the actual number is 3.4 per year.  In 2016, there are already 5 “significant events”.

failures-per-year

The “2 per year” comes from including pre-1936 decades for which ICOLD//WISE reporting was sparse and anectdotal(far left of chart above). The actual long term “significant incidents” rate from 1936 is 3.3, continuing the last two decades at about the same level (3.4).  The real story is in the frequency of high severity events such as Mt. Polly and Samarco.  In the last two decades that rate is 180% above  the 80 year rate of 0.5/year at 0.9. For the coming decade, actuarial science puts the expected rate at 1.4 to 1.5 per year for failures with releases exceeding 1 million cubic meters. ( see trend lines, below)

 Many will be in the range of severity between Mt Polley (25 million)and Samarco.(40 to 60 million)

failure-ternds-2006-2015

 If ICMM’s model is taken up as a standard for the legal frameworks of mining globally or as standards for responsible self governance we can expect these drastically elevating trends of catastrophic failures to rise even more steeply with ever greater non remediable consequence.

 

The ICMM/Golder “report”  gives a cursory and poorly informed examination of root causes of failure again based on ICOLD’s 21 year old report, selecting only 3 out of the total 18 catastrophic failures since 1996   ICMM/Golder systematically  avoid the many authoritative deeply informed reviews of cause of failure especially Blight et. al’s re- review Merriespruitt which summed up a better list of root causes of failure.

 

These roots of failure, as Golder and each of ICMM’s members knows include

  • a brain drain in the industry;
  • incompetence in understanding and applying available technology;
  • global shifts which have determinant long term adverse financial viability at the nation level
  • the proof that the “economics of scale” metric no longer works at the very low grade levels where head grades and discovery fgrades converge.
  • A dramatic and debilitating 23% loss in productivity industry wide between 2004 and 2013 according to McKinsey
  • That grade is now “king” and the mining industry has entered  an entirely new era where old assumptions, old industry standards and even the body of existing “best knowledge” no longer apply. Deloitte and many others naming this.

Writing before Mt Polley right after Anglo, one the “ICMM 23”  took a public hit from Chile  on tailings and other violations, Jack Caldwell foreshadowed and summarized some of these same elements at work within Anglo.

After it audited several mining projects at Anglo Sur’s El Soldado, located 132 kilometres from Santiago in the district of Nogales, the authority detected multiple irregularities, including failing to fully preserve and relocate vegetation, ineffective wetland conservation plans and water management, lack of environmental monitoring, and tailings in in unpermitted areas

Do they really have tailings in unpermitted areas?  How can so large a mining company make so egregious a mistake?

Recall that Mike Davies (now VP Environmental Things for Teck) said that mining companies cut cost to the point that failures occur and then they take another look at costs and maybe adjust cost cutting and staff layoff.  Maybe Anglo is at that point.

I know the past head of tailings for Anglo in South Africa quit because he was overworked: required to review at least one facility a week, including those worldwide.  You cannot even travel to most of the mines in a week, net alone review their tailings operations.

“Tonight at the party for next week’s Heap Leach Conference, we discussed this story.  One cynic told the story of McMillian Blodell in BC who decided it was cheaper to pay the fines than obey the laws.  His opinion is that maybe this is what is happening in Chile.  As he noted, $5 million is a hell of a lot less than $300 million or the cost of establishing wetlands and putting tailings in distant sites.

Jack Caldwell.September 23, 2013 I think Mining.com ( reprinted at Mining.com)

This is the basket of snakes the Golder concocted ICMM Tailings Management Report is trying to keep the lid on.

ICMM/Golder cite three main national systems of guidance as containing a complete and thorough reference on “best knowledge/ best practice” and specifiy that adoption of any of these systems as corporate policy on Tailings Management would satisfy the ICMM commitment: ANCOLD( Australian National System), MAC/CDA( Canadian National Systems) and SANS(South African National System.  They identify 6 additional provisions not explicit in these three framework standards that must additionally be incorporated in company policy to meet the ICMM commitment. The 6 provisions are essentially what constitutes BHP’s recently announced “reforms ” in tailings management.

The venerable Dirk Van Zyl , a member of the ICMM expert review panel noted that ICMM did not address the root causes of the Samarco failure nevertheless congratulated them on what they had addressed.

-size:medium;”>Dirk van Zyl, a member of the expert panel that was constituted for the review, said

: “I am delighted that as a result of the review, CEOs of the world’s 23 leading mining companies committed to a new ICMM framework on how to further enhance the safe management of tailings dams.

The review did not cover how or why the Samarco tailings dam failed, but takes lessons from the tragic event as well as from other tailing dam failures. It finds that a higher level of governance and assurance is key to confirming existing safety standards are implemented consistently.”

Coverage in main stream business and mining news has been sparse and  without enthusiasm, analysis or comment.

GOLDER/ICMM IGNORING FACT OF ENTIRELY NEW ERA IN MINING

Golder / ICMM ignore the facts of this new era which began about 10 years ago even as they have intentionally orchestrated  their version of the new era at increased global risk  of failures by over producing to intentionally drive out smaller mines, intentionally cause them to fail.  ICMM and its membership have their own version of a new era governed by their membership, a few large miners who can better manipulate supply, demand and thereby better control price.  The outfall of that ICCM plan is dramatic and precipitous escalation of public risk and consequence in the intentionally squeezed mines which will be left to fail or spun off to speculative avaricious foreign investors who want a foothold for other business opportunities. ( somewhere I have the article by Cecelia Jasmine of Info Mine/mining.com actually quoting this from ICMM) 

Essentially in this intellectually thin document Golder ICMM cling to the old model  and try to minimize any expectations of needed changes and new directions in business fundamentals among their 23 dominant metals producing members. 

 

This clinging to worn out no longer valid old ways,old assumptions and old models is apparent in several notable quotes for which there is no excuse and no defense and which frame the cornerstone of the approach and decalarations

 

(1) They essentially say  that all that exists as best knowledge needs no expansion, addition, or fundamental change to stem the ever rising trend of catastrophic failures

 

 

“Existing published guidance and standards documentation fully embrace the knowledge required to prevent such failures. The shortcoming lies not in the state of knowledge, but rather in the efficacy with which that knowledge is applied. Therefore, efforts moving forward should focus on improved implementation and verification of controls, rather than restatement of them.

 

There are numerous clearly established trends which desperately need addressing to prevent catastropic loss and stem its ever rising trend of annual frequency and severity of loss: the increasing levels of fines in lower grades that preclude the use of alternatives of slurry deposition which the Mt Polley Dam Committee has declared to be “outmoded technology”, the proportion of major producers with older TSF’s at maximum  design capacity and height,  the increasing deviation between predicted and actual performance of processing and production measures and on financial feasibility,the work of Bernhrad Dold on how ARD emerges in tailings, the absence of adequate in house competence to oversee or even evaluate the competence of outside consultants, a severe shortage of competence industry wide.

 

2.  Ignoring the actual vastness of this leading edge and in some cases long  established  “best knowledge” more deeply mapping the circumstances and attributes which have manifested and will continue to manifest in  catastrophic failure ICCM Golder cite adherence to a few very vaguely developed standards and guidelines like ANCOLD, MAP/CDA and SANS as evidencing sustainable performance

A year ago an international coalition of responsible mining advocates wrote to ICMM urging their members to undertake reforms and formally adopt the guidance of the Mt Polley Dam Committee and a loss prevention risk management response to the alarming rise of catastrophic failures post 1995 mapped by Lindsay Bowker and Co-author David Chambers in July 2015.  .

https://www.earthworksaction.org/library/detail/letter_to_icmm_re_tailings_dam_review#.WEam32YzXNP

Earthworks and the international coalition is still considering what response to make.to this ICMM “report” completely avoiding every issue raised by the International Coalition.

 

 

Lindsay Newland Bowker, CPCU, ARM Environmental Risk Manager

Bowker Associates

Science & Research In The Public Interest

15 Cove Meadow Rd.

Stonington, Maine 04681

 

207 367 5145

 

lindsaynewlandbowker@gmail.com

lindsaynewlandbowker.wordpress.com

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Additional background and links on ICMM’s Tailings Initiative and Policy

  1. Annoucement that this study would be undertaken.  Includes a list of all members and contact info at ICMM

https://www.icmm.com/en-gb/news/icmm-announces-global-tailings-management-review

Posted in ANCOLD, AngloAmerican, Dirk Van Zyl, Golder Associates, ICCM Tailings Management Report, Jack Caldwell, MAC/CDA Tailings Guidelines, Mike Davies, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Full Government Report on Samarco:Vale’s Unauthorized Slimes Depositions a Primary Cause of The Fatal Failure Indictment Finds

In stark contrast to the scene and tone of the public release of the BHP commissioned “Cause of Failure Report ” where Dr. Morgenstern gave the committees version of events poised , elegant in his immaculate suit from a large video screen, the government report released this week begins with a poem speaking to the unspeakable.

“O sertão vai virar mar
É o mar virando lama
Gosto amargo do Rio Doce
De Regência a Mariana

Quantas pessoas sem rumo como canoas sem remos
Ou pescadores sem linha e sem anzóis?
Quantas pessoas sem sorte, quantas pessoas com fome?
Quantas pessoas sem nome, quantas pessoas sem voz?

Morreu debaixo da lama, morreu debaixo do trem?
Ele era filho de alguém, e tinha filho e mulher?
Isso ninguém quer saber, com isso ninguém se importa
Parece que essas pessoas já nascem mortas

Quem olha acima, do alto, ou na TV em segundos
Às vezes vê todo mundo, mas não enxerga ninguém
E não enxerga a nobreza de quem tem pouco, mas ama
De quem defende o que ama e valoriza o que tem”1

O MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, por seus Procuradores da República
signatários, no exercício de suas atribuições constitucionais e legais, comparecem,
respeitosamente, perante Vossa Excelência, com base nos procedimentos investigatórios em
epígrafe e com fundamento no art. 129, I, da Constituição Federal, para oferecer DENÚNCIA
1 Cacimba”

The bumps and squiggles of the Bing translation soften its deep grieving somewhat

The backcountry will turn sea
Is the sea turning into mud
Bitter taste of Rio Doce
Regency Mariana
How many people aimless as canoes without oars
Or fishermen without line and without hooks?
How many people no luck, how many people hungry?
How many people without name, how many people without a voice?
Dead under the mud, died under the train?
He was the son of someone, and had a son and wife?
That nobody wants to know, with that nobody cares
It seems that these people are born dead
Who looks up, from the top, or on TV in seconds
Sometimes you see everyone, but I can’t see nobody
And can’t see the nobility of who has little, but he loves
Who defends what he loves and appreciates what has 1
The FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, for their public prosecutors
Contracting Parties, in the exercise of their constitutional and legal assignments, attend,respectfully, before your Excellency, on the basis of the investigative procedures in epigraph and based on art. 129, I, of the Federal Constitution to provide
COMPLAINT
 emanuely
Remembering Emanuely, age 5, swept from her fathers arms as he tried to outrun the towering wall of advancing mud.  While her parents held out hope they posted this sign,  Her tiny shattered body was found 40 km downstream.
The full text of the report in Portuguese is at http://www.mpf.mp.br/mg/sala-de-imprensa/docs/denuncia-samarco.
Indictments and poems of lament and sorrow certainly belong after such an event and what is now known about how this avoidable catastrophe formed and evolved but surely more was needed.  In Brazil, In Canada,  within the world’s major mining associations, in the Board rooms of the worlds largest miners, in legislative chambers, not one useful reform has been put forward.  A lot of rhetoric has been thrown as around  declaring “no more failures” but it all just allows what was to continue..There is no real change.
Our data tell us this decade 2015-2025 will see the largest number of catastrophic mine failures ever in recorded history.
Indictments and poems of lament at the devastation a greedy thoughtless trio of companies co created is just not enough in the face of what is to come.
Lindsay Newland Bowker, Executive Director
Bowker Associates Science & Research In The Public Interest
Stonington Maine
November 4 2016
Here are some excerpts from the report
VALES DEPOSITINSOF SLIMES CAUSED THE FATAL CO MIXING OF SLIMES & SANDS WHICH LED TO CATASTROPHIC FAILURE
On p. 41 of the charge sheet, it says Vale sent 5.817 million cubic meters of waste into the Dike 2 reservoir,  meant for slimes. A simulation detailed in SETEC Report no. 994 (whatever that is) found that without Vale, the slimes would never have flowed into the sands reservoir. 

 
Apesar disso, a VALE encaminhou, entre os anos de 2008 a 2015, para o SRF, no Dique 2, o volume de 5.187.610 m3. Em média, a produção de rejeito da VALE encaminhada para a barragem do Fundão foi igual a 648.451 m3, anualmente. O Laudo SETEC n.º 994 identificou, por meio de simulação, que se não houvesse a contribuição de rejeitos da VALE para o reservatório de Fundão a premissa de separação dos rejeitos, concebida no projeto original com o alteamento conjunto dos dois diques, não teria se perdido durante a operação.
From the introduction
“The victims have been identified. All those who lost their lives.
Can you imagine being overtaken by a wall of mud and waste ? An accident? No. It was caused by  technical flaws in implementation and maintenance consciously
chosen  to reduce costs and increase dividends.Over many years, countless actions by all three companies at the highest levels, aware of the dangers in their choices,  avoided that reality  hoping to buy time with technically dubious measures”.
With respect to VOGBR, the indictment refutes almost every declaration briefly posted by VOGBR after they learned they were named.  Bowker Associates excerpted and posted some of that text which maintained that they did no site inspections, were given the data and the form of analysis to be performed by Samarco.  The indictment says VOGBR was fully aware of the history of the Fundao and of the specific deficiencies that were cited as the root cause of failure and leant their name to a finding of stability when they knew that was not true.(pp 28-30+)
FINDINGS OF VALES USE OF FUNDAO NOT AUTHORIZED AND CONTRUBUTED TO FAILURE
“It was determined Vale’s tailings depositions greatly  influenced  the rise of the
reservoir level,contributing  about 27% of all the mud deposited between the
years 2008 to 2015 in Fundão dam. Without their contribution, despite the ommission of drainage elements and the poor planning on the slimes dam, the slimes would not have  overrun their dam into the  sandy tailings or resulted in the failure to maintain the 200m beach.  Vale is found to have itentionally hidden and falsified information information on its long term use of the Fundao for it sown tailngs ” PP 40-41+ ( For further details see Bowker Associates post on Vale’s use of the Fundao)
Posted in samarco failure 1 year anniversary, samarco failure government findings, Uncategorized | Leave a comment